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ST AGGERED PRICE-SETTING, STAGGERED WAGE-SETTING, 
AND BUSINESS CYCLE PERSISTENCE 
Kevin X. D. Huang and Zheng Liu 
ABSTRACT 
111 
Staggered price-setting and staggered wage-setting are commonly viewed as similar 
mechanisms in generating persistent real effects of monetary shocks. In this paper, we distinguish 
the two mechanisms in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. We show that, 
although the dynamic price-setting and wage-setting equations are alike, a key parameter governing 
persistence is linked to the underlying preferences and technologies in different ways. Under 
staggered wage-setting, an intertemporal smoothing incentive in labor hours prevents the households 
from adjusting their wages too quickly in response to an aggregate demand shock, while such 
incentives are absent under staggered price-setting. With reasonable parameter values, the staggered 
price mechanism by itself is incapable of, while the staggered wage mechanism plays an important 
role in generating persistence. 
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STAGGERED PRICE-SETTING, STAGGERED WAGE-SETTING, 
AND BUSINESS CYCLE PERSISTENCE* 
1. Introduction 
How monetary policy shocks affect business cycle duration has been a challenging issue concerning 
economists and policy makers. Recent empirical studies reveal that monetary shocks can have long-
lasting effects on real activities (e.g., Gali (1992) and Christiano, et a1. (2000)). Yet, it has been a 
difficult task Lo identify monetary transmission mechanisms that can generate such effects. 1 
In a seminal paper, Taylor (1980) proposes a staggered wage mechanism to help solve the persis-
tence issue. In his model, nominal wages are set in a staggered fashion. That is, not all wage decisions 
are made at the same time, and each wage, after being set, is fixed for a short period of time such as a 
year. As summarized in Taylor (1999), there is much empirical evidence that price contracts and wage 
contracts are staggered. Taylor (1980) shows that this staggered wage mechanism can lead to endoge-
nous wage inertia and thereby persistence in employment movements following a temporary shock. He 
states the intuition as follows: 
Because of the staggering, some finns will have established their wage rates prior to 
the current negotiations, but others will establish their wage rates in future periods. Hence, 
when considering relative wages, finns and unions must look both forward and backward 
in time to see what other workers will be paid during their own contract period. In effect, 
each contract is written relative to other contracts, and this causes shocks to be passed on 
from one contract to another ... contract fonnation in this model generates an inertia of 
wages which parallels the persistence of unemployment. 
More recently, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (CKM) (2000) carry this intuition to a general equi-
librium environment. But, perhaps surprisingly, they find that a staggered price mechanism by itself 
cannot generate persistent real effects following monetary shocks, an apparent puzzle in light of Tay-
lor's insights. There are two interpretations of this puzzle. On. one hand, CKM (2000) suggest that 
it is difficult to explain persistence based on staggered nominal contracts in a general equilibrium 
framework, and therefore "mechanisms to solve the persistence problem must be found elsewhere." 
On the other hand, Taylor (1999) conjectures that the findings of CKM (2000) "may indicate that the 
monopolistic competition (stationary market power) model may not be sufficient as a microeconomic 
*We wo uld like to than k Olivier B lanchard, V.V. C hari , Lawrence C hristiano, Bill Duper, Peter Ireland , Pahick Kehoe, Nobuhiro 
K,yo taki, NJ rayana Kocherlakota, Ellen McGrattan, Lee Oha nian , Mi chael Parkin , and Louis Phaneu f for useful conversations and helpful 
comments n our work. The paper has been prese nted at Bos ton College, Brandeis University, Clark University, CREFE at UQAM, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of M inneapolis, the University of Minnesota, the University of Westem Ontario, Utah State Universi ty, and the 
Econometri c Society 1999 Winter Meetin g. We thank the seminar participants for comments. We are especially grateful to an anonymous 
referee for excellent commen ts and ins igh tful suggestions that have significantly improved the exposition of the paper. The usual disclaimer 
applies . 
'Al though models with information lags and price stickiness are shown to be quite successful in generating output fluctuations driven 
by monetary shocks, the res ul ting e ffects are usually contemporaneous rather than persistent. See, for example, Lucas (1972), Lucas and 
Woodford ( 1993), Rotemberg (1996), and Yun (1996). 
foundation." Behind the two lines of arguments seems to be a common perception that a staggered price 
mechanism and a staggered wage mechanism have similar implications on persistence: either that they 
both contribute to generating persistence or that neither does SO.2 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a third interpretation of the persistence puzzle. We find that, 
in a general equiliblium environment, staggered wage-setting can have quite different implications on 
real persistence than staggered price-setting. With reasonable values of parameters in preferences and 
technologies, staggered price-setting by itself is incapable of, while staggered wage-setting has a great 
potential in generating real persistence even when the underlying price- and wage-setting rules are 
derived from the standard monopolistic competition framework. The two types of staggering mecha-
nisms have different implications because the key parameter that governs persistence in the dynamic 
price-setting and the dynamic wage-setting equations is here a function of the underlying parameters 
in preferences and technologies of the economy. Although the two equations are apparently identical, 
this functional form and thereby the value of the persistence parameter in general differ across the two 
mechanisms. 
To compare the implications on persistence of the two types of staggering mechanisms, we build 
on Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that 
features monopolistic competition in both the goods market and the labor market, with firms setting 
nominal prices for their products and households setting nominal wages for their labor skills. We 
derive the households' wage-setting and the firms' price-setting rules from their optimizing decisions 
and thus link these decision rules to the underlying preferences and technologies in the model. We show 
that a critical parameter governing persistence is the elasticity of relative wage (or price) with respect 
to aggregate den1and in the wage (or price) equation. A greater value of this parameter corresponds to 
less persistence because it implies a greater response of wage (or price) decisions to aggregate demand 
shocks, and thus a faster adjustment of the wage (or price) index and a quicker return of aggregate 
output to steady state. When wage-setting decisions are staggered, the elasticity of relative wage with 
respect to aggregate demand is less than one under plausible parameter values, and it decreases with 
both the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor skills in the production technology and 
the degree of relative risk aversion in labor hours in households' preferences. In contrast, when pricing 
decisions are staggered, the elasticity of relative price with respect to aggregate den1and is typically 
2This view has recently been emphasized by Taylor (1999), who states that "the equations are essentially the same for 
wage setting and price setting." 
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greater than one, and increases with the degree of relative risk aversion in labor hours. Consequently, 
a staggered wage mechanism tends to generate persistence but a staggered price mechanism by itself 
does not. 
To understand the driving forces of these results, we compare the optimal responses of households 
and finns to a monetary shock with the two different types of nominal rigidities. When wage-setting 
decisions are staggered, imperfectly competitive households choose nominal wages to balance the ex-
pected marginal utility of leisw·e and of wage income within the duration of their wage contracts, taking 
into account the effects of the wage decisions on the demand for their labor services and thus their wage 
incomes as well. When an expansionary monetary shock occurs, the wage index does not increase pro-
portionally due to staggering in wage-setting decisions. The price level does not fully rise either, since 
profit maximization requires that prices equal a constant markup over the marginal cost determined by 
the wage index. Therefore, real aggregate demand rises, raising both households' income and finns' 
demand for labor services. The higher income reduces the households' marginal utility of income 
and the higher labor demand raises their marginal utility of leisure. Utility maximization requires that 
households who can renew contracts raise wages to re-balance their marginal utility of income and of 
leisure. We find that, within a reasonable range of parameter values, the optimal percentage increase 
in relative wages is typically less than the percentage increase in aggregate demand. The reason is that 
a higher relative wage reduces both the demand for the corresponding type of labor services (substi-
tution effect) and the associated wage income (income effect). These effects both serve to restore the 
balance between the marginal utility of income and of leisure, and thus the optimal increase in relati ve 
\yages is small. In consequence, the wage index rises slowly, and movements in aggregate output and 
ell1ploYll1ent are gradual and long-lasting. Moreover, the easier to substitute across labor skills and the 
more willing the households to smooth labor hours, the smaller the optimal wage adjustment and the 
greater the magnitude of output persistence. If we measure the magnitude of persistence by the ratio of 
output response at the end of the initial contract duration to that in the impact period (i.e., a "contract 
multiplier"), this ratio can be as high as 56% under reasonable parameter values. 
The staggered price mechanism works differently. Under this mechanism, impedectly cOll1petitive 
fim1s choose prices to maximize expected profits within the duration of their price contracts, taking into 
account the effects of the pricing decisions on the demand for their goods and thus their revenues as 
well. We show that the optimal price is a linear function of a firm's expected marginal costs within its 
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contract duration. Thus a higher price will be set if the firm is expecting higher marginal costs. Stag-
gered price-setting allows an expansionary monetary shock to raise real aggregate demand and thus 
fim1s' demand for labor services as well. Facing higher real income and greater demand for its labor 
skill, each household responds by raising its wage accordingly, driving up the marginal cost of produc-
tion. If households prefer smoothed labor hours, the equilibrium percentage increase in real wage will 
exceed the increase in aggregate demand, causing marginal cost to rise by more than aggregate demand 
does. In response, profit-maximizing firms will fully adjust their prices whenever they have a chance 
to renew contracts. Consequently, movements in aggregate output and employn1ent, after their initial 
responses to the shock, are fast and transitory. In contrast to the staggered wage model, the contract 
multiplier is here negative for reasonable parameter values. 
The inability of staggered price-setting by itself to generate real persistence raises the questions: 
are there important interactions between the nominal rigidity in the form of staggered price-setting 
and some forms of real rigidity that may potentially contribute to generating persistence? To answer 
this question, we construct a model with real rigidity in the fonn of labor market segmentation. The 
model features a large number of firms producing differentiated products, each using a combination of 
differentiated labor skills that are specific to the firm. To derive price-setting and wage-setting rules, 
we assume again that there is monopolistic con1petition in the goods market and in the sector-specific 
labor markets. We find that introducing labor market segmentation does not change the implications 
of the staggered wage-setting mechanism on aggregate dynamics, but it does improve the abili ty of 
the staggered price-setting mechanism to generate persistent real effects of money. Under staggered 
wage-setting, firms make identical pricing decisions in a symmetric equilibrium and the equilibrium 
dynamics are therefore identical to those with a fully integrated labor market. Under staggered price-
setting, however, labor market segmentation implies that a firm's marginal cost is detem1ined by the 
firm-specific wage rate and an increase in the demand for labor skills in one sector does not lead to a 
rise in the real wage or the real marginal cost facing firms in other sectors. Thus, a firm does not have 
an incentive to change its price rapidly even when it has the chance to set a new price. In consequence, 
the adjustment in the price level is sluggish and the response of aggregate output is persistent. 
There are several strands of literature that are related to our work. Following the lead of CKNI 
(2000), there has been a growing literature on persistence, focusing on interactions between the nom-
inal rigidity in the form of staggered price-setting and various forms of real rigidity. For example, 
Bergin and Feenstra (2000) show that the interactions between staggered price-setting and the real 
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rigidity introduced through a non-CES aggregation technology and a roundabout input-output structure 
help generate real persistence; Kiley (1997) demonstrates that a high degree of increasing returns at the 
individual fim1level helps produce persistence in a staggered price model; and Gust (1997) emphasizes 
that impediments to factor mobility across sectors contribute to propagating monetary shocks. Follow-
ing the seminal work of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Blanchard (1986), attempts have also been 
made to model staggered wage contracts in a dynamic general equilibrium environn1ent. For example, 
Erceg (1997) analyzes a model with both staggered price and staggered wage contracts and studies the 
role of this double staggering mechanism in propagating monetary shocks, while Huang and Liu (1999) 
show that, in the absence of real rigidity, adding a staggered price mechanism on top of a staggered 
wage mechanism does not help magnify persistence. The work by Cho, Cooley, and Phaneuf (1997) 
evaluates the welfare effect of nominal wage contracts. The persistence issue has also been examined in 
general equilibrium models with state-dependent pricing rules. Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) pro-
vide a general equilibrium framework for analyzing the implications of state-dependent price-setting 
rules. Dotsey, et. al (1997) show that staggered price-setting can arise from small menu costs, and 
incorporating variable capacity utilization in such a n10del helps deliver persistence. The issue of real 
persistence is paralleled by the issue of inflation persistence. Ball (1994) demonstrates that, while the 
standard Taylor type of nominal contracts can potentially generate persistence in aggregate output and 
the price level, it encounters difficulties in generating persistence in the inflation rate. Ball (1995) 
shows that imperfect credibility of the central bank may help resolve the inflation persistence problem, 
while Fuhrer and Moore (1995) find that a model with staggered contracts in relative wages (instead of 
nominal wages) can generate substantial inflation persistence. In sun1illary, there has been a renewed 
interest in examining the role of staggered nominal contracts and their interactions with various forms 
of real rigidity in propagating monetary shocks (see also the survey by Taylor (1999)). Yet, little has 
been done to explore the microstructures that may distinguish the staggered wage mechanism from the 
staggered price mechanism. In this paper, we fill this gap by distinguishing the two mechanisms in 
their capabilities of generating persistence in a dynamic general equilibrium environn1ent. 
It is important to emphasize that we do not attempt to propose a single friction model that is able 
to fully account for the dynamic output responses to monetary shocks. In fact, the recent work by 
Christiano, et. al (1997) suggests that it is unlikely for a single-friction model to provide a con1plete 
account of the real effects of monetary shocks. To provide such an account, a combination of frictions 
5 
is required. Our work suggests that, in such a multi-friction model, staggered wage contracts can be an 
important contributing mechanism. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the conventional wisdom on 
the equivalence of staggered price-setting and staggered wage-setting based on a simplified version 
of Taylor's (1980) model, briefly describes the CKM (2000) persistence puzzle, and demonstrates the 
difference in the key persistence parameter under the two types of staggering mechanisms. Section 3 
formally explores the different implications of the two types of nominal rigidities in a fully specified 
dynamic general equilibrium model. Section 4 evaluates the robustness of the main results by allowing 
for capital accumulation in the model. Section 5 examines the interactions between the real rigidity in 
the form of labor market segmentation and the nominal rigidity associated with each of the two types 
of staggering mechanisms. Section 6 concludes the paper. The Appendix describes the baseline model 
with capital accumulation. 
2. The conventional wisdom and the persistence puzzle 
Taylor (1980) shows that a reduced form model of staggered wage-setting is able to generate persis-
tent fluctuations in employment and aggregate output following a temporary aggregate demand shock. 
The conventional wisdom holds that staggered wage-setting and staggered price-setting should have 
similar implications on the dynamics of aggregate output and the price level. More recently, CKM 
(2000) try to carry Taylor's intuition into a general equilibrium environment, and based on the con-
ventional wisdom, they focus on examining the ability of staggered price-setting (rather than staggered 
wage-setting as originally proposed by Taylor (1980)) to generate output persistence when the pricing 
rules are explicitly derived from individuals' optimizing behaviors. They find, perhaps surprisingly, 
that the staggered price mechanism by itself does not generate output persistence. In what follows, we 
show that the conventional wisdom about the equivalence between staggered price-setting and stag-
gered wage-setting does not hold in general. Under reasonable values of parameters in preferences and 
technologies, staggered wage-setting has a much greater potential in generating real persistence than 
does staggered price-setting. 
2.1. The conventional wisdom 
The conventional wisdom suggests that staggered price-setting has similar implications as staggered 
wage-setting. The intuition is based on the following pair of models in the spirit of Taylor (1980). 3 
3The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the style of exposition here. 
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Modell (staggered price-setting): 
In each period, a fraction liN of firms can set prices, and in doing so, they take into account 
the prevailing price which is an average of the N contractual prices determined in the current and the 
previous N - 1 periods. Therefore, when setting new prices, firms look at both the future and the past 
pricing decisions because these are part of the prevailing price. When N = 2, the model with staggered 
price-setting is described by the following equations: 
(1) 
P; = Pt + ,Yt, (2) 
Pt = ~(p; + EtP;+l) , (3) 
where Pt denotes the prevailing price level, Pt is the price set in period t for t and t + 1, Pt is the 
price a firm would set if it could set it just for period t, Yt is aggregate output, and E t is a conditional 
expectation operator. All variables are in log-terms. 
Model 2 (staggered wage-setting): 
In a model with staggered wage-setting, pricing decisions are synchronized. Thus, the price level 
is equal to each individual firm's price, which is in turn given by a constant markup over the nominal 
wage index. The following equations describe the model with staggered wage-setting. 
(4) 
(5) 
w; = fit + ,Yt, (6) 
(7) 
In these equations, the upper case variables Pt , Pt , and W t denote the price level, the price decision, 
and the wage index in level-terms while the lower case variables are in log-terms. The variable Wt is 
the wage set in period t for t and t + 1 and w; is the wage a household would set if it could set it just 
for period t. 
Equation (4) says that the price Pt is a constant markup over the wage index Wt (with a markup 
parameter given by J-lp > 1). Thus, given that firms' pricing decisions are synchronized, the price level 
is proportional to the wage index. Inspecting the two models reveals that if the value of the parameter 
7 
{did not depend on whether it is prices or wages that are staggered, then the two models would imply 
the same aggregate dynamics. 
2.2. The output dynamics and the persistence puzzle 
In both models, a key parameter governing aggregate dynamics is {. Equations (2) and (6) suggest 
that a greater value of { implies a more sensitive response of price-setting or wage-setting decisions to 
changes in aggregate demand, thus faster adjustments in prices and wages, and a shorter-lived response 
of aggregate output. To generate output persistence requires a small value of {. In this sense, the 
dynamic issue of persistence hinges upon the static issue of how small { is. 
To illustrate the role of { in generating persistence, we solve the models by assuming a money 
demand equation given by Yt = mt - tit , where mt denotes the logarithm of the money stock. By 
combining equations (2) and (3) (or equations (6) and (7)), we obtain 
(8) 
where Xt cOLTesponds to Pt in the model with staggered price-setting (Modell) or to Wt in the model 
with staggered wage-setting (Model 2). The system can then be reduced to a second order differencc 
equation in Xt by substituting for fit and Yt using (8) and the money demand equation, respectively. 
Under an additional assumption that mt follows a random walk process, a simple solution to this 
difference equation can be obtained, and the implied output dynamic equation is given by 
1+a 
Yt = aYt- l + -2- (mt - mt-d, 
1- v'r 
where a = 1 + v'r' (9) 
Here, two special cases are noteworthy: if { = 1, then a = ° and there is no persistence; if { = 0, then 
a = 1 and the output follows a random walk process. In general, a snlaller { corresponds to a greater 
value of a and hence a more persistent response of aggregate output following the shock. The model 
can generate persistence if and only if { < 1. 
The solution to the output dynamics in (9) reveals that if { is a structural parameter that voids 
any distinctions between staggered price-setting and staggered wage-setting, then the two models are 
apparently identical, an observation that forms the basis of the conventional arguments. Yet, in a general 
equilibrium environment, {is no longer a structural parameter. It is instead determined by fundanlental 
parameters in preferences and technologies. An important question is then, with plausible values of 
the fundamental parameters and with r so determined, can a model with staggered price (or wage) 
contracts generate persistent fluctuations in aggregate output? CKM (2000) try to answer this question 
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and conclude that staggered price-setting does not generate output persistence because the magnitude 
of "y so detennined is too large for empirically plausible parameter values. Based on this conclusion, 
it is commonly inferred that a dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered wage-setting cannot 
generate persistence either. 
2.3. Different implications of staggered price-setting and staggered wage-setting 
Our n1ain finding in this paper is that, in a general equilibrium environment, the value of r depends 
on whether it is price-setting or wage-setting that is staggered. Thus, the two types of staggering 
mechanisms have different implications on the dynamic effects of monetary shocks on the price level 
and aggregate output. The formal model will be presented in Section 3. Here we sun1ll1arize the results 
and highlight the difference in r between the two mechanisms. 
To illustrate our points, we assume that the period-utility function is given by U(C) - V(L), where 
C and L denote consumption and labor hours, and the usual Inada conditions hold.4 Given this utility 
function, we show that, under staggered price-setting, the key persistence parameter r is given by 
rp = ~c + 6, (0) 
where ~c == -U"C jU' > 0 and ez == V" LjV' > 0 are relative risk aversion with respect to consump-
tion and labor hours, respectively, both evaluated at steady state. On the other hand, under staggered 
wage-setting, "y is given by 
~c + ~l 
rw = 1 + Ow~l' (1) 
where Ow > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between labor skills. It immediately follows that the 
conventional wisdom fails to hold in general. Particularly, since rw ~ rp in light of (0) and (1), it is 
more likely to generate persistence under staggered wage-setting than is under staggered price-setting. 
Indeed, with empirically plausible parameter values, staggered wage-setting tends to generate per-
sistence while staggered price-setting does not. The parameter ~c corresponds to the relative risk 
aversion with respect to consumption. The general consensus is that the value of ec is between 1 and 
10, and it is typically set to 1 or slightly larger in most business cycle literature (e.g., Prescott (986)). 
The paran1eter 6 corresponds to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor hours. 
4In the formal model presented in Section 3, we assume that real money balances enter individuals' utility fu nction. 
Here, it is not essential to have money in the utility function because we have assumed a static money demand equati on, an 
assumption that we will relax in Section 4. 
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Most empirical literature suggests that this elasticity is less than one, or equivalently, ~l > 1 (e.g. , Pan-
cave ('7)). The parameter ew corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor 
skills. Available empirical evidence suggests a value of 8w between 2 and 6 (see, for exalllple, Griffin 
(1992, 1996)).5 With ~l > 1, IP is necessarily greater than one so that, under staggered price-setting, 
the response of output oscillates around steady state and there is no persistence. In contrast, IW is less 
than one provided that ~c < 1 + (8w -1)6, a condition that holds for a broad range of plausible param-
eter values (e.g. , it holds with ~c = 1, corresponding to log-utility in consumption). In consequence, 
under staggered wage-setting, the response of output is gradual and long-lasting. 
Although fronl a purely theoretical point of view, it is possible to have both IP and IW less or greater 
than one, it requires extreme values of the fundamental parameters. For example, if ~c and 6 are both 
sufficiently small, then we can have IW ~ IP < 1. In this case, both types of staggering can generate 
persistence. On the other hand, if ~c is sufficiently large, then we can have IP ~ IW > 1. In this case, 
neither staggered price-setting nor staggered wage-setting leads to persistence. 
To summalize, the conventional wisdom about the equivalence between staggered price-setting and 
staggered wage-setting can be justified only under extrenle parameter values. In general, the two types 
of staggering mechanisms are embodied with different implications on the dynamic effects of lllonetal-y 
shocks on the price level and real output. While the staggered price lllechanism by itself is incapable 
of, the staggered wage mechanism has a much greater potential in generating real persistence. 
3. A dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered contracts 
In this section, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model from which we derive optimal 
pricing and wage-setting rules. We then solve a log-linearized version of the model's equilibrium deci -
sion rules and show that staggered price-setting and staggered wage-setting in general imply different 
aggregate dynamics. 
3.1. The model 
The economy is populated by a large number of households and firms. There is a government 
conducting lllonetary policy. To derive firms' price-setting and households' wage-setting rules, we 
5The estimate of Ow by Griffin (1992, 1996) is based on firm level data representing different industries. As noted by 
Griffin (1992), the estimate tends to be biased downward for two reasons: (i) all firms in the data set are subject to Affirmative 
Action which restricts labor substitutability, and (il) the employment data does not include employee characteristics such as 
workers' age, experience, and education. Griffin (1996) shows that, when Affirmative Action is explicitly accounted for, the 
estimate of Ow is about 6. 
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assume monopolistic competition in both the goods lllarket and the labor market. In each period t , 
the economy experiences a realization of shocks St, while the history of events up to date t is st == 
(so, .. . , St) with probability 7r( st). The initial realization So is given. 
Each household is endowed with a differentiated labor skill indexed by i E [0, 1]. The preferences 
of household i are represented by the utility function 
00 
LL{3t7r(st) {U(C*(i,st)) - V(L(i,st))} , (12) 
t=O st 
where (3 E (0,1) is a discount factor, C*(i, st) == [bC(i, st)V + (1- b)(M(i, st)jP(st))VP/v is aCES 
composite of consumption and real money balances, and L( i, st) denotes hours worked. In each period 
t and each event st, the household faces a budget constraint given by 
(13) 
where B(i , st+l) is i's holdings of a nominal bond that costs D(st+1 Ist) dollars at st and pays one 
dollar in period t + 1 if st+l is realized, W(i, st) is a nominal wage of i's labor skill, Ld(i, st) is a 
demand schedule for i's labor, II(i, st) is its share of profits, and T(i, st) is a lump-sum transfer it 
receives from the government. 
The consumption good is a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) composite of differentiated goods. It is given by 
(14) 
where 8p > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the goods. Minimizing the expenditure on all 
goods ft P(j)C( i, j)dj subject to (14) yields the demand function of i for good j: 
d . . t J, s . t 
(
P( ' t)) -op 
C (z,J, s ) = P(st) C(z, s ), (15) 
1 
where the price index is given by P(st) = (f01 P(j, st)1-0Pdj) l-(Jp. The total denland of all house-
holds for good j is the sum of all individual demand. That is, 
d . t _ d . . t· J, s t 1 (P(' t)) -op 
Y (J, s ) = fa C (',J, s )d. = P(st) Y(s ), (16) 
where Y(st) == f01 C(i, st)di denotes the aggregate demand for the composite good. 
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Each good j E [0 , 1] is produced using a composite of all types of labor skills as an input. The 
production function is 
(17) 
where Bw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor skills. Mininlizing the labor 
cost fl W (i)L(j, i)di subject to (17) results in the demand function of firm j for labor skill i: 
Ld(" t) = [W(i, st)] -ow L(' t) J,Z,S W(st) J,S , (18) 
- [1, 0 'J 1/(1-0w) , , 
where W(st) = fo W(z, st)l- w dz IS a wage mdex. The total demand of all firms for labor 
skill i is thus given by 
Ld(i, st) = [~~~:?] -Ow L(st), (19) 
where L(st) = f01 L(j, st)dj denotes the aggregate demand for the composite labor skill. 
Households are price takers in the goods market and monopolistic competitors in the labor market. 
They set wages for their labor skills, taking the labor demand schedule (19) as given. On the other hand, 
firms are wage takers in the labor market and monopolistic competitors in the goods market. They set 
prices for their products, taking the goods demand schedule (16) as given. 
We are interested in the dynamic effects of monetary policy on aggregate output fluctuations, For 
this purpose, we assume that the government's newly created money is distributed to all households via 
lump-sum transfers so that f01 T(i, st) = M(st) - M(st-1). 
An equilibrium in this economy consists of allocations C(i, st), M(i, st), and B(i , st+1) and wages 
W(i, st) for household i E [0,1]; allocations Y(j, st) and L(j, st) and prices P(j, st) for firm j E 
[0 , 1]' together with prices D(st+1Ist) , P(st), and W(st) that satisfy the following conditions: (i) 
taking the wages and all prices but its own as given, each firm's allocations and price solve its profit 
maximization problenl; (ii) taking the prices and all wages but its own as given, each household's 
allocations and wage solve its utility maximization problem; (iii) money market and bond market clear; 
and (iv) monetary policy is as specified. 
In what follows, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all households in a given wage-
setting cohort make identical wage decisions and all firms in a given price-setting cohort make identical 
pricing decisions. Since there are complete contingent bond markets, equilibrium consumption flows 
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and real money balances are identical across all households.6 Combining this observation with the 
market clearing conditions, we have C(i, st) = f01 C(i, st)di == Y(st) and M(i, st) = M(st) for all i. 
We now derive the optimal price-setting and wage-setting rules. In each period t , a fraction 1/ Np 
of firms can set new prices and a fraction of l/Nw of households can set new wages. Once a price (or 
wage) is set, it remains fixed for Np (or N w ) periods. We denote by N the duration of price or wage 
contracts. 
Under staggered price contracts, all firms are divided into Np = N cohorts based on the timing of 
their pricing decisions while households synchronize their wage decisions (i.e., N w = 1). If firm j can 
set a new price in period t, it solves 
t+N-1 
Maxp(j,st) L L D(ST lst) [P(j, st) - W(sT)]yd(j, ST), (20) 
T=t ST 
subject to (16). The resulting optimal pricing rule is given by 
P(' st) = ~ 2:~~~-12:ST D(STlst)W(ST)yd(j, ST) 
J, Bp - 1 2:~~~-1 2:sT D(STlst)yd(j, ST) (21) 
Thus a firm's optimal price is a constant markup over a weighted average of n1arginal costs within the 
duration of price contracts, where the marginal cost is given by the nominal wage index since the firm's 
production requires all types of labor as inputs. If a firm can set a new price and expects a rise in its 
marginal cost, it will respond by setting a higher price for the entire contract duration. 
Sin1ilarly, under staggered wage contracts, all households are divided into N w = N cohorts based 
on the timing of their wage-setting decisions while firms synchronize their pricing decisions (i.e., Np = 
1). If a household can set a new wage, its utility maximization problem also includes a choice with 
6We assume, without loss of generality, that the initial wealth is identical across households. Thus, with the complete 
insurance provided by the contingent bonds, equilibrium consumption flows and real money balances will also be iden-
tical across households. Yet, as pointed out by an anonymous referee, a move from a complete-insurance economy to a 
no-insurance one would potentially lead to different equilibrium dynamics because, with incomplete insurance, households' 
consumption will in general depend on their own incomes that may differ across households when wage decisions are stag-
gered. An important question is whether such a move will fundamentally change our main results. To solve a model with no 
insurance, however, we need to keep track of a non-degenerate income distribution among households on a period-by-period 
basis. This will make analytical solutions impossible and also pose enormous computational difficulties. In fact, in our view, 
developing techniques to solve such a model would be the subject of a paper in itself. Given that our objective is to clarify 
a common perception about the equivalence between the two types of staggering mechanisms and that existing literature 
focuses on full -insurance economies, we choose to articulate our points with a full-insurance model. We believe that a model 
of staggered wage-setting with incomplete insurance is an extremely important subject for future research. 
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respect to nominal wages. The optimal wage decision rule derived from the first order conditions for 
the household's problem is given by 
where - Vz(i, ST) and Uc(i, ST) denote the marginal utility of leisure and of consun1ption, Ld(i, ST) is 
the demand function for household i's labor skill given by (19), and 1r(sTlst) = 1r(ST)j1f(st) is the 
conditional probability of ST given st , for T ~ t. Therefore, the household's optimal wage is a constant 
"markup" over the ratio of weighted marginal utilities of leisure to marginal utilities of income within 
the duration of wage contracts, with the weights given by normalized demand for its labor services . If 
the household expects an increase in the marginal utility of leisure or a fall in the marginal utility of 
income within the next N periods, it will respond by setting a higher nominal wage. 
3.2. A comparison of the two types of staggering mechanisms 
To gain further insights into the dynamic wage-setting and pricing decision rules, we log-linearize 
the decision rules around a deterministic steady state. The linearized version of the price-setting equa-
tion (21) is given by 
N-l N-l N-l 
Pt = L bjPt-j + E t L bjpt+j + N'~ 1 E t L Yt+j, 
j=l j=l j=O 
(23) 
where the lower-case variables denote log-deviations of the corresponding upper-case variables from 
their steady state values and the event argument st is replaced by the time subscript t to save notation . 
We have also set (3 = 1 to simplify the expressions. The weights on lagged and forward prices in (23) 
are given by bj = N(N-!l) and the coefficient ,p in front of current and future outputs is a parameLer 
determined by fundamental parameters in preferences and technologies. Similarly, by setting (3 = 1, 
the log-linearized version of the wage-setting equation (22) can be written as 
N-l N-l N-l 
Wt = L bjWt-j + E t L bjWt+j + N': 1 E t L Yt+j, 
j=l j=l j=O 
(24) 
where the weights bj are the same as in (23) and ,w is a parameter that is linked to preference and 
technology parameters, not necessarily in the same way as is ,po 
The intertemporal backward- and forward-looking effects emphasized by Taylor (1980) are re-
flected by the weights bj on the lagged and forward prices or wages. Obviously, such intertemporal 
effects are identical across the two types of staggering mechanisms. The distinctions between the two 
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mechanisms lie with the distinctions between rp and rw, the elasticity of relative price and relative 
wage with respect to the expected changes in future outputs. 
In a simple model of staggered contracts such as Taylor's (1980), it is presumed that rp = rw 
so that the linearized price-setting and wage-setting rules are apparently identical, with appropriate 
interpretations of notations. This idea forms the basis of the conventional wisdom that staggered price-
setting and staggered wage-setting have similar implications on the dynamics for the price level and 
real output. 
In a general equilibrium environment such as the one presented here, the r's are no longer a struc-
tural parameter. They are instead determined by fundamental parameters in the model. Specifically, rp 
and rw are given by equations (10) and (11) in Section 2.3. With empirically plausible values of the 
fundamental parameters, rp is necessarily greater than one so that, in response to a change in aggregate 
demand, firms quickly adjust their prices whenever they can renew their contracts. Thus, there is no 
output persistence under staggered price-setting. In contrast, rw is less than one for a broad range of 
plausible parameter values and it decreases with both Ow, the elasticity of substitution between differen-
tiated labor skills, and ez, the relative risk aversion in labor hours. Under staggered wage-setting, given 
that the households have incentive to smooth labor hours across time (Le., ez > 0), a greater elasticity 
of substitution between labor skills implies a smaller incentive for the households to adjust their relati ve 
wages, and consequently a more persistent response of aggregate output following a monetary shock. 
On the other hand, given that Ow > 1, a greater intertemporal smoothing incentive in labor how-s (i.e., 
a larger value of ez) leads to a smaller adjustment in relative wages and thus a more persistent output 
response. In all these cases, wage adjustments are sluggish because households would like to avoid 
excessive fluctuations in their employed hours and they can achieve this only if they keep their wages 
in line with others. Thus, the staggered wage mechanism, unlike the staggered price nlechanism, has a 
great potential in generating real persistence. 
We have established, based on log-linearized equilibrium decision rules, that the dynanlic issue of 
persistence hinges upon the static issue of how small r is, and the r's under staggered price-setting and 
staggered wage-setting are in general different. We now show that the dynamic counterparts of rp and 
rw, the elasticity of relative price or relative wage with respect to aggregate output derived from the 
individuals' first order conditions, take similar forms as in (10) and (11). 
15 
Under staggered price-setting, the first order condition with respect to wage-setting decisions im-
plies that the real wage is given by 
Ow -VL(Y(st)) 
---Ow - 1 Uc(Y(st)) , (25) 
where we have used the equilibrium conditions W(i, st) = W(st) = W(st), L(i, st) = L (st) 
Y(st), the market clearing condition C(i, st) = Y(st), and the money demand equation M(st) 
P ( st) y (st). Taking total differentiation of (25) yields the elasticity of real wage with respect to aggre-
gate demand. It is given by 
_ 8(WIP) Y 
Ew,Y = 8Y (W IP) = ec + el, (26) 
where f.c == -U"CIU' and f.l == V"LIV' are the relative risk aversion with respect to consumption 
and labor hours, not necessarily evaluated at steady state. Clearly, Ew,Y is a dynamic counterpart of the 
key persistence paranleter rp in (10). 
Under staggered wage-setting, if a household could set a wage just for the CWTent period, then its 
optimal wage decision (denoted by W*(st)) would be given by 
(27) 
where we have used the equilibrium conditions that P(j, st) = P(st) (since prices are flexible) and 
the optimal price is a constant markup over the wage index, so that P(st) = f,lpW(st) , with f,lp == 
Op I (Op - 1). Other equilibrium conditions we have used to obtain (27) include the production function 
Y(st) = L(st), the nlarket clearing condition C(i, st) = Y(st) (for all i E [0, 1]), and the money 
demand equation M(st) = P(st)Y(st). Let w == W* lTV denote the relative wage, then the elasticity 
of relative wage with respect to aggregate demand is given by 
(28) 
Apparently, the key persistence parameter rw under staggered wage-setting is a steady state counterpart 
of Ew,Y. 
To summarize, under staggered price-setting, firms face quickly changing real labor costs and re-
spond by adjusting their prices quickly. In contrast, under staggered wage-setting, an intertemporal 
snl00thing incentive in labor hours deters households from changing their relative wages too quickly. 
Therefore, while staggered price-setting is incapable of, staggered wage-setting has a great potential in 
generating real persistence. 
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3.3. Some numerical examples 
We now illustrate our results in Section 3.2 by considering a commonly used within-period utility 
function given by 
C* 1-0" L 1+TJ 
U(C*) - V(L) = -- - - , 
I-a 1+'1] (29) 
With this utility function, we have ec = a and 6 = '1]. The special case with a 1 corresponds 
to log-utility in consumption, while in the case with a = 0, the utility function in1plies zero income 
effect in households' wage-setting decisions. In Table 1, we display the contrast between rp and [W 
for a plausible range of parameter values with log-utility (the upper panel) and with zero-income-effect 
utility (the lower panel). The table confirms our conclusion that staggered wage-setting and staggered 
price-setting in general lead to different persistence implications and that staggered wage-setting tends 
to generate persistence while staggered price-setting does not. 
Table 2 displays the range of parameter values within which staggered wage-setting can generate 
real persistence (i.e., the conditions under which rw < 1). The table shows that, for given values of ew 
and a, there always exists a plausible range of '1] values that allows rw < 1; and for given values of ew 
and '1] , there is always a plausible range of a values that permits rw < 1. 
4. The model with intertemporallinks 
To establish the distinctions between the two types of staggering mechanisms in a general equi-
librium environment, we have so far abstracted from intertemporallinks such as capital accumulation. 
With no capital, a change in aggregate output implies a one-for-one change in consumption, and thus 
there may be a substantial income effect in households' wage decisions. With capital, the change in 
consumption is attenuated and the income effect is weakened. An important question is whether incor-
porating capital and thus weakening the income effect will overturn the analytical results obtained in 
the baseline model. We now show that it does not. 
To obtain equilibrium dynamics in the model with capital, we first log-linearize the equilibrium 
conditions under each of the two types of staggering mechanisms, and then solve the linear system 
of equations based on calibrated parameters. The details of the model specification and the parameter 
calibration are described in the Appendix. The calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 1. 
All parameter values are standard except for ew , the elasticity of substitution among differentiated labor 
skills. Based on the micro-studies by Griffin (1992, 1996), we conduct our numerical experiments with 
different values of ew ranging from 2 to 6. 
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In our simulation, we assume that the money supply grows at a rate /-l(st), which follows a station-
ary stochastic process given by 
(30) 
where 0 < p < 1, and ct has an i.i.d. normal distribution with zero mean and finite variance. To 
compute the inlpulse responses of key variables in the model following a monetary shock, we choose 
the magnitude of the innovation telm ct so that the money stock rises by 1% one year after the shock. 
Figure 1 plots the impulse response functions of output under the two types of staggering, with 
four price- or wage-setting cohorts (i.e., N = 4). Under staggered price-setting, aggregate output 
initially rises, and then returns to steady state as soon as the initial contract expires (i.e., one year after 
the shock). Thus, there is no persistence. This finding is consistent with that of CKM's (2000). In 
contrast, under staggered wage-setting, the response of aggregate output dies out gradually following 
its initial increase, and the greater the value of Ow, the more persistent the output response. To measure 
the magnitude of persistence, we define a "contract multiplier" as the ratio of the output response at the 
end of the initial contract duration to that in the impact period. The contract multiplier is negative under 
the staggered price mechanism whereas it increases from 23% to 43% and then to 56% when Ow lises 
from 2 to 4 and then to 6 under the staggered wage mechanism. Thus, when capital is incorporated 
into the baseline model, the basic results about the distinctions between the two types of staggering 
mechanisms stand film: the weakened income effect in households' wage decisions introduced through 
capital accumulation does not weaken the ability of staggered wage-setting to produce persistence, 
neither does it overturn the inability of staggered price-setting in generating persistence. This flnding 
is consistent with the numerical results displayed in Table 1, which shows that reducing the income 
effect to zero through parameter restrictions helps lower the values of both rw and rp, but for plausible 
parameter values, it does not reverse the inequality rw < 1 ~ rp' 
Figures 2 and 3 display the impulse responses of the key vmiables under the two altell1ative forms 
of staggering, where we have set Ow = 4. Under both types of staggering, consumption, investment, 
and employment are all procyclical; investment is more volatile than output, which is in tull1 more 
volatile than consumption; and the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate m-e both procyclical. 
These are all standm-d features of a monetm-y business cycle model without nominal rigidities (e.g. 
Cooley and Hansen (1995)). Except for the lack of "liquidity effect," these features are broadly con-
sistent with the business cycle facts in the U.S. economy. Nonetheless, the two types of staggering 
mechanisms differ in two key aspects. First, the impulse responses of both real and nominal vm-iables 
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under staggered wage-setting are more persistent than those under staggered price-setting. Second, real 
wage is strongly procyclical when pricing decisions are staggered, while it is weakly countercyclical 
when wage-setting decisions are staggered. Evidence on the cyclicality of real wage is mixed. As sur-
veyed by Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), existing empirical studies do not suggest systematically 
procyclical or countercyclical real wages. 7 
To summarize, the basic insights elaborated by our analytical solutions in Sections 3 stand up to 
the incorporation of such intertemporallinks as capital accumulation and interest-rate-sensitive money 
denland. While the staggered price mechanism by itself is incapable of, the staggered wage mechanism 
plays an important role in generating persistence. 
5. Interactions between staggered nominal contracts and real rigidities 
The inability of staggered price-setting by itself to generate persistent real effects of money natu-
rally raises the question of whether there are important interactions between the nominal rigidi ty in the 
form of staggered price-setting and some forms of real rigidity that may help generate persistence. To 
provide an answer to this question, we modify the nlodel presented in Section 3 by incorporating a type 
of real rigidity in the form of labor market segmentation. We find that such a model modification does 
improve the ability of staggered price-setting to generate output persistence, though it does not change 
the implications of staggered wage-setting on the dynamics for the price level and aggregate output. 
In the model, there is a continuum of firms producing differentiated goods indexed in the interval 
[0 , 1]. A firm j's production requires a composite of labor skills that are specific to j , with the pro-
duction function given by (17). The firm-specific labor skills are differentiated and are supplied by 
a continuum of households indexed in the interval [0,1]. Each household consists of a continuum of 
workers working for different firms. Workers from the same household possess identical skills, while 
7 Although the weak: cyclicality of real wages is commonly viewed as a salient feature of the business cycle, recent 
empirical studies suggest that the cyclical behaviors of real wages depend on the level of data aggregation and on the sources 
of the shocks. If microdata instead of aggregate data are used, then there is evidence that real wages are procyclical (e.g., 
Bils (1 985) and Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994)). On the other hand, if the response of real wages to aggregate demand 
shocks is disentangled from that to aggregate supply shocks, then real wages are countercyclical in response to aggregate 
demand shocks but procyclical in response to aggregate supply shocks (e.g., Fleishman (1999)). Since monetary shocks are 
the only driving force of fluctuations in our models, we need to compare the models' predictions on real wage behaviors 
with the response of real wages to monetary shocks in the data to assess the model's empirical relevance. While the work by 
Bernanke and Carey (1996) suggests countercyclical behaviors ofreal wages following monetary shocks, the recent study by 
Chris tiano, et a1. (1999) shows that, in response to monetary shocks, real wages are acyclical or weakly procyclical. One way 
to induce acyclical real wages in our model is to have pricing and wage decisions both staggered. 
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the skills across households are differentiated. Once a worker is assigned to a particular firm j, she 
stays at j and cannot move to other sectors. Each household enjoys utility from the consumption of a 
composite good and real money balances, and suffers disutility from working. The utility function of a 
household i is given by (12), where L(i, st) is the sum of i's hours worked for all firms.8 
It is straightforward to verify that the demand schedule for good j is given by (16). The denland 
schedule for labor skill i that is specific to sector j is given by (18), with W(i, st) and W(st) replaced 
by W(j, i, st) and W(j, st), respectively, since the labor skill is specific to sector j. Taking the demand 
schedules as given, each firm sets a price for its product and each household sets a wage for its worker 
assigned to each sector. Under staggered price contracts, the optimal price-setting rule is similar to 
(21) in the model with integrated labor markets, but with the overall wage index W(st) replaced by 
a sector specific wage index W(j, st). Under staggered wage contracts, the optinlal wage-setting rule 
is given by (22), but with W(i, st) and Ld(i, ST) replaced by W(j, i, st) and Ld(j, i, ST) , respectively. 
The log-linearized price-setting and wage-setting equations are similar to (23) and (24) in the previous 
model, with possibly different values for the r's. 
Under staggered wage-setting, pricing decisions are assumed to be flexible so that all firIns make 
identical pricing decisions in a symmetric equilibrium. Thus, staggered wage-setting produces the same 
equilibrium dynamics as in the case with a fully integrated labor market. In particular, the persistence 
parameter is here given by 
sl ec + el 
rw = 1 + Bwel ' (31) 
which is identical to rw in (11). It follows that staggered wage-setting generates the same implications 
on persistence, regardless of whether the labor markets are segmented or not. 
The implications of staggered price-setting on aggregate dynamics, however, does depend on whether 
the labor markets are integrated or segmented. With segmented labor markets, an increase in the de-
mand for labor in one sector does not necessarily drive up the real wages and hence the real nlarginal 
costs facing firms in other sectors. Under staggered price-setting, wage-setting decisions are assunled 
8The assumption that each household sends out a large number of workers to work at different firms is not crucial. The 
same equilibrium dynamics can be obtained in an alternative model in which each household supplies one worker to a spedfic 
firm and a different firm uses a different set of differentiated labor skills. In these cases, we can derive both price-setting and 
wage-setting rules within the framework of monopolistic competition. Although the same equilibrium price-setting rules can 
also be obtained in an environment where each firm uses only one type of labor, such an environment is not appropriate for 
modeling wage-setting behaviors. 
to be flexible and thus all workers in a given sector make identical wage decisions. The optimal wage-
setting rule implies that the real wage, and hence the real marginal cost facing firms in sector j is given 
by 
ew -Vi (L(j , st)) 
---
ew -1 Uc(Y(st)) 
- Vi ([P(j, st)/ P(st)]-OPY(st) ) 
Uc(Y(st)) (32) 
where the second equality follows from the demand schedule (16) and the production function (17) . 
Further, let P* (j, st) denote the price that firm j would set if it could set it just for peliod t , then 
P*(j , st) = /-LpW(j , st) , where /-Lp = ep/(ep - 1) is a markup. Equation (32) can then be written as 
(33) 
Total differentiation yields the elasticity of relative price with respect to aggregate output given by 
_ 8 (p* / P) Y ~c + ~l 
Ep * ,Y = 8Y P* / P = 1 + ep~l ' (34) 
where p* = P* / P denotes the relative price, and ~c and ~l are the relative risk aversion with respect 
to consumption and labor hours, respectively. The persistence parameter in the log-linearized pricing 
equation corresponds to this elasticity evaluated at steady state and is given by 
(35) 
Since 'Y~l < 1 for reasonable parameter values, staggered price-setting, when coupled with the labor 
market segmentation, can generate real persistence. 
To summarize, while the staggered price-setting mechanism by itself does not generate persis-
tence, the interactions between staggered price-setting and the real rigidity in the fom1 of labor market 
segmentation can produce persistent real effects of monetary shocks. In contrast, the staggered wage-
setting mechanism by itself can generate persistence even in the absence of any fom1s of real rigidity. 
6. Conclusion 
We have shown that, with optimizing individuals, staggered wage contracts and staggered price 
contracts have different implications on persistence in general. Although the dynamic price-setting and 
the dynamic wage-setting equations are apparently identical, the key parameter that governs persistence 
in the two equations is linked to preferences and technologies in different ways, resulting in different 
predictions on how aggregate output responds to monetary shocks. For plausible parameter values, the 
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staggered price-setting mechanism by itself is incapable of, while the staggered wage-setting mecha-
nism plays an important role in generating persistence. The difference between the two mechanisnls 
cannot possibly be uncovered unless individuals ' optimizing behaviors are explicitly modeled. 
Our analysis has implications not just for staggered nominal contracts, but for other models of 
nominal rigidity. For example, menu costs are conmlonly viewed as an important source of nominal 
price rigidity (e.g. , Mankiw (1985) and Akerlof and Yellen (1985)). With slllall menu costs of adjusting 
prices, however, SOllle fOlms of real rigidity are needed for monetary shocks to generate large real 
effects (e.g., Ball and Romer (1990)). Our analysis suggests that, in a general equilibrium environlllent, 
the response of relative wages to aggregate demand shocks in general differs from that of relative prices, 
and that, in the absence of real rigidity, the nominal wage rigidity (in the fOlm of staggered wage 
contracts) tends to generate larger real effects than does the nominal price rigidity. For this reason, 
we suspect that if lllenu costs are applied to wage-setting, then the nominal wage rigidity (in the form 
of wage adjustment costs) can be an important mechanism in propagating monetary shocks. Indeed, 
staggering in nominal contracts and menu costs are closely related. For example, staggering in pricing 
decisions can arise as an equilibrium outcome when firms face heterogeneous menu costs of adjusting 
prices (e.g., Dotsey, et al. (1997, 1999)). Similarly, if households (or unions) face a non-degenerate 
distribution of wage adjustment costs, then it is likely to have endogenous staggering in wage decisions. 
For the reasons discussed in our current paper, such staggering in wage-setting can potentially lead to 
large and persistent real effects of money. This possibility is worth investigating in future work. 
Appendix. The model with capital accumulation 
This appendix presents a model of staggered nominal contracts with capital accumulation. The 
model is identical to the baseline model presented in Section 3 with two exceptions. First, films ' pro-
duction requires both labor and capital as inputs. Second, households' problems now involve decisions 
on capi tal accumulation. 
A.I. The model 
We begin with the firms' problems. Each firm j E [0,1] has access to a Cobb-Douglas production 
function 
(36) 
. ~ 
where K (j, st) is the firm 's capital input, L (j, st) = [J~l L (j, i, st) ''Ii;;; 1 di 1 'w -1 is a composite of labor 
skills used by the firm, and a E (0,1) is the share of the capital input. Let Rk(st) denote the nominal 
rental rate on capital. By minimizing the production cost Rk(st)K(j) + J01 W(i, st)L(j, i)di subject 
to (36), we obtain the demand functions for L(j, st), K(j, st), and L(j, i, st). The resulting marginal 
cost function is MC(st) = aW(st)l-Q:Rk(st)Q:, where a = a-Q:(1- a)Q:-1. It is straightforward 
to verify that, under staggered price-setting, the optimal pricing decision rule is given by (21), with 
W(ST) replaced by the marginal cost function MC(ST). 
We next specify the households' problems. The utility function is the same as in the baseline model. 
The budget constraint is now given by 
P(st)C(i, i) + P(i)I(i, st) [1+ 1> (~;:'S:~l)) ] + ~ D(st+lli)B(i, stH) + M(i, st) 
< W(i, st)Ld(i, st) + Rk(st)K(i, st- 1) + II(i, st) + B(i, st) + M(i, st-1) + T(i , st), (37) 
where I( i, st) and ¢(I( i, st) j K (i, st-1)) are the investment and the capital adjustn1ent cost of house-
hold i in st, respectively. Capital accumulation is governed by 
(38) 
where 5 E (0,1) is a capital depreciation rate. 
Household i maximizes utility choosing C(i, st), I(i, st), M(i, st), and B(i, st+1), subject to (37)-
(38) and a borrowing constraint B(i, st) 2: -B for some large positive number B, taking prices 
P(st), W(st), Rk(st), and D(st+1Ist) and initial conditions K(i, S- l), M(i, S-l), and B(i, sO) as 
given. If the household is a member of the cohort that can set new wages, it also chooses a nomi-
nal wage W(i, st) for the duration of its wage contract. To simplify notations, we denote by Q(i , st) 
the investment-capital ratio I( i, st) j K( i, st-1) and by H( Q) the effective cost of capital 1 + ¢( Q) + 
Q¢'(Q). The first order conditions are 
Uc( i, st) 
Urn (i,st)jJ5(st) 
D(st+1Ist) 
Uc(i, st)H(Q(i, st)) 
-\(i, st)J5(st), 
-\(i, st) - (32: 1f(st+1Ist)-\(i, st+1), 
(31f( st+11 st)-\( i, st+1) j -\( i, st), 
(32: 1f(st+1Ist)Uc(i, st+1){Rk(st+1)jJ5(st+1) + 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
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t+N-1 
= 2: 2:,BT-t7r (sTls t )A(i, sT)Ld(i, sT)(1 - 8w ), 
T=t ST 
where Uc(i, st), Um(i, st), and - Vz(i, st) denote the marginal utility of consunlption, real money 
balances, and leisure, respectively, A( i, st) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget 
constraint, and 7r( ST 1st) = 7r( ST) / 7r( st) is the conditional probability of ST given st, for T ~ t. 
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Equations (39)-(42) are standard first order conditions with respect to the household's choice of 
consumption, money balances, bond holdings, and capital investment, respectively. Equation (43) cor-
responds to the wage setting rule. The left-hand side of this equation is the expected present value 
of marginal utility gains due to an increase in wage and thus reduced labor hours during the contract 
periods, while the right-hand side is the expected present value of marginal utility losses due to unem-
ployed how's and thus a lower wage inconle. The wage is set to balance the gains and the losses at the 
margin. Since there are complete contingent asset markets, each household's consumption and nloney 
balance decisions depend only on initial distributions of wealth. Without loss of generality, we assunle 
that the initial holdings of wealth are identical across households. This assumption, along with the 
assumption that consumption and leisure are additively separable in the utility function , implies that 
the equilibrium consumption and money balances are identical across households for each realization 
of st. That is, C(i, st) = C(st) and M(i, st) = M(st). In consequence, A(i, st) = A(st) for all i, and 
thus the wage decision rule implied by (43) depends only on aggregate variables. 
Capital market clearing requires that K(st-1) == Jo1 K(i, st-1) di = Jo1 K(j, st) dj, and goods 
market clearing implies that 
C(st) + I( st) [1+ ¢ (~~~~1) )] = K( i-I)" L(st) 1-". (44) 
Note that, in each period t, firms' decisions on capital demand are made after the realization of st, 
while the capital stock available for rent is chosen by households in st-1. 
The rest of the optimization conditions is the same as in Section 3. Given the money supply process 
(30), an equilibrium can be defined analogously. We solve a log-linearized version of the equilibrium 
decision rules using standard computation methods.9 
A.2. The calibration 
We assume that the capital adjustment cost function is given by ¢(I/K) = ('l/J/ 2) (I/K)2 and the 
utility function is given by (29). The parameters to be calibrated include the subjective discount factor 
9The details of computation methods are available from the authors upon request. 
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/3, the preference parameters b, v , and TJ , the capital share a , the depreciation rate 6, the adjustment 
cost parameter 'ljJ, the monetary policy parameter p, and the parameters 8w and 8p in the aggregation 
technologies. The calibrated values are summarized in Table 1. 
In our baseline model, we set N = 4 so that a period in the model corresponds to a quarter. 
Following the standard business cycle literature, we choose /3 = 0.96 1/ 4 . To assign values for b and v , 
we use the implied money demand equation 
(
M(st)) 1 (b) t 1 (R(st) - 1) 
log P (st ) = -1- v 10g 1- b + 10g(C(s)) - 1- v 10g R (st ) l 
where R ( st) = (l:st+l D( st+1Ist)) -1 is the gross nominal interest rate. The regression of this equation 
as performed in CKM (2000) implies that v = -1.56 and b = 0.98 for quarterly U.S. data with a sample 
range from quarter one in 1960 to quarter four in 1995. The serial correlation paran1eter p of money 
growth rate is set to 0.57, based on quarterly U.S. data on M1 from quarter three in 1959 to quarter two 
in 1995 (see also CKM (2000)). 
We next choose a = 0.33 and 6 = 1 - 0.921/ 4 so that the baseline model predicts an annualized 
capital-output ratio of 2.6 and an investment-output ratio of 0.21. The parameter TJ is set to 2, corre-
sponding to an intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor hours equal to 0.5, which is consistent 
with most empirical literature on labor supply. We adjust 'ljJ so that the model predicts a standard de-
vi ation of aggregate investment to be 3.23 times as large as that of output, in accordance with the U.S. 
data. Following CKM (2000), we set 8p = 10 in the staggered price model, corresponding to a steady 
state markup of 11 %. Based on the micro-studies by Griffin (1992, 1996), we set the range of 8w to be 
between 2 and 6. 
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Table 1. Values of the key persistence parameters: {TP' TW} 
Log-utility in consumption (0" = 1) 
7]=1 7]=2 7]=5 7] = 10 
Ow = 2 {2,0.67} {3,0.60} {6,0.55} {11,0.52} 
Ow = 4 {2,0.40} {3,0.33} {6,0.29} {11,0.27} 
Ow = 6 {2,0.29} {3,0.23} {6,0.19} {11,0.18} 
Zero-income-effect utility {O" = O} 
7]=1 7]=2 7]=5 7] = 10 
.Ow = 2 {1,0.33} {2,0.40} {5, 0.45} {10,0.48} 
Ow = 4 {1,0.20} {2,0.22} {5, 0.24} {10,0.24} 
Ow = 6 {1,0.14} {2,0. 15} {5,0.16} {10,0.16} 
Table 2. The range of parameter values so that TW < 1 
The range of 7] values, given other parameters 
0"=1 0"=2 0"=5 0" = 10 
Ow = 2 (0,00) (1,00) (4,00) (9,00) 
Ow = 4 (0,00) (0.33,00) (1.33,00) (3,00) 
Ow = 6 (0,00) (0.2,00) (0.8,00) (1.8,00) 
The range of 0" values, given other parameters 
7]=1 7]=2 7]=5 7] = 10 
Ow = 2 (0,2) (0,3) (0,6) (0, 11) 
Ow = 4 (0,4) (0,7) (0,16) (0,31 ) 
Ow = 6 (0,6) (0,11) (0,26) (0,51 ) 
Table 3. 
Calibrated parameter values in the model with capital 
Preferences: 
_1_0*1-0- _ _ l_L(i)l+77 
1-0- 1+77 
where 0* = [bOll + (1 - b)(M/ P)lIJ 1/1l 
Technologies: Y(j) = Ka L 1- a [ ~ l~ Composite labor: L = J L( i) Ow di 
[ ~ l~ Composite good: Y = J Y (j) Op dj p 
Capital accumulation: 
K t = It + (1 - 8)Kt- 1 
¢(It/Kt- 1 ) = *(!t/Kt_d 2 
Subjective discount factor 
Number of price- or wage-setting cohorts 
Staggered wage model 
Staggered price model 
(J = 1, 'f) = 2 
b = 0.9S, v = -1.56 
a = 0.33 
Bw E {2, 4, 6} 
Bp = 10 
8 = 1 - 0.921/ 4 
'IjJ adjusted 
p = 0.57 
(3 = 0.961/ 4 
Np = 1, N w = 4 
Np = 4, N w = 1 
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Abstract 
Staggered Price-Setting, Staggered Wage-Setting, 
and Business Cycle Persistence* 
Kevin X.D. Huang and Zheng Liu 
Octo ber 2000 
Staggered price-setting and staggered wage-setting are commonly viewed as sinlilar mechanisms 
in generating persistent real effects of monetary shocks. In this paper, we distinguish the two mech-
anisms in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. We show that, although the dynamic 
price-setting and wage-setting equations are alike, a key parameter governing persistence is linked to 
the underlying preferences and technologies in different ways. Under staggered wage-setting, an in-
tertemporal smoothing incentive in labor hours prevents the households from adjusting their wages too 
quickly in response to an aggregate demand shock, while such incentives are absent under staggered 
price-setting. With reasonable parameter values, the staggered price mechanism by itself is incapable 
of, while the staggered wage mechanism plays an important role in generating persistence. 
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1. Introduction 
How monetary policy shocks affect business cycle duration has been a challenging issue concerning 
economists and policy makers. Recent empirical studies reveal that monetary shocks can have long-
lasting effects on real activities (e.g., Gali (1992) and Christiano, et al. (2000)). Yet, it has been a 
difficult task to identify monetary transmission mechanisms that can generate such effects. 1 
In a seminal paper, Taylor (1980) proposes a staggered wage mechanism to help solve the persis-
tence issue. In his model, nominal wages are set in a staggered fashion. That is, not all wage decisions 
are made at the same time, and each wage, after being set, is fixed for a short period of time such as a 
year. As summruized in Taylor (1999), there is much empirical evidence that price contracts and wage 
contracts ru"e staggered. Taylor (1980) shows that this staggered wage mechanisn1 can lead to endoge-
nous wage inertia and thereby persistence in employment movements following a temporary shock. He 
states the intuition as follows: 
Because of the staggering, some firms will have established their wage rates prior to 
the current negotiations, but others will establish their wage rates in future periods. Hence, 
when considering relative wages, firms and unions must look both forward and backward 
in time to see what other workers will be paid during their own contract period. In effect, 
each contract is written relative to other contracts, and this causes shocks to be passed on 
from one contract to another ... contract formation in this model generates an inertia of 
wages which parallels the persistence of unemployment. 
More recently, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (CKM) (2000) carry this intuition to a general equi-
librium environment. But, perhaps surprisingly, they find that a staggered price mechanism by itself 
cannot generate persistent real effects following monetary shocks, an apparent puzzle in light of Tay-
lor's insights. There are two interpretations of this puzzle. On one hand, CKM (2000) suggest that 
it is difficult to explain persistence based on staggered nominal contracts in a general equilibrium 
framework, and therefore "mechanisms to solve the persistence problem must be found elsewhere." 
On the other hand, Taylor (1999) conjectures that the findings of CKM (2000) "may indicate that the 
monopolistic competition (stationary market power) model may not be sufficient as a nlicroeconomic 
1 Although models with information lags and price stickiness are shown to be quite successful in generating output fluctu -
atio ns driven by monetary shocks, the resulting effects are usually contemporaneous rather than persistent. See, for example, 
Lucas (1972), Lucas and Woodford (1993), Rotemberg (1996), and Yun (1996). 
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